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We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject
to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare
at any equilibrium of bidder behavior, via a smoothness argument. This unifies numerous recent results on
the price of anarchy of simple auctions. Our results extend to polymatroid and matching constraints, and
we discuss extensions to more general matroid intersections.
1. INTRODUCTION
A principle is tasked with allocating resources to a set of self-interested agents, subject
to constraints that determine which allocations are feasible. The principle (or “seller”)
wishes to allocate resources in a socially efficient manner, with the understanding that the
agents will interact with any prescribed mechanism in such a way to maximize their own
utilities. This familiar setup, now ubiquitous in the algorithmic game theory literature,
captures a variety of important scenarios: from selling a single good on eBay, to scheduling
tasks in a cloud-based system, to running auctions for online advertising space. A classic
approach to this mechanism design problem is to elicit, from each agent, a full description
of their preferences over all possible outcomes, then find the welfare-maximizing allocation
according to the bids and charge appropriate (truth-incentivizing) payments. Unfortunately,
this optimal mechanism scales poorly as the number of potential outcomes and agents grows,
both in the difficulty of the optimization task and in the communication requirements
imposed by the protocol.
There has been a significant recent line of work studying the performance of so-called “sim-
ple” mechanisms. These auctions are typically characterized by restricted bidding languages,
simple greedy allocation rules, and straightforward payment computations – practical con-
siderations that can be more desireable than optimality or truthfulness. Examples include
the GSP auction for sponsored search ads [Caragiannis et al. 2014], simultaneous item
auctions for selling indivisible items to buyers with submodular valuations [Christodoulou
et al. 2008; Hassidim et al. 2011], uniform-price auctions for selling many homogeneous
goods [Markakis and Telelis 2012], position auctions with externalities [Roughgarden and
Tardos 2012] and many others. These mechanisms are not truthful nor efficient, but each has
been shown to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at every Nash equilibrium
of bidder behavior.
Recent works [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; Syrgkanis 2012; Roughgarden 2012] showed
that each of these mechanisms satisfies a natural best-response property, termed smoothness,
and that this property implies approximate efficiency at equilibrium. Moreover, smoothness
not only guarantees high efficiency, but this guarantee is robust in many ways: it extends
to learning behavior on the part of the bidders, uncertainty on the parameters of the game,
simultaneous and sequentially occurring mechanisms, and budget constraints. On the other
hand, truthful mechanisms tend to not have such composability properties; one might go so
far as to say that incentive compatible mechanisms overfit the mechanism design setting
by treating it in isolation and not taking into account strategic influences and variations
external to the mechanism.
The smoothness property, while eminently useful, is a semantic concept. It is based on an
existential property of a given mechanism, and does not directly give algorithmic guidelines
about what mechanisms are smooth or how one should design them. This is reminiscient
of truthfulness, which is also a semantic property; it becomes far more useful and usable
when paired with a descriptive algorithmic condition, such as optimality (as in the VCG
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
05
60
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
8 M
ar 
20
15
A:2 B. Lucier and V. Syrgkanis
mechanism) or monotonicity (for single-parameter problems). Can we give analogous, useful
characterizations of algorithmic conditions that guarantee smoothness?
A common feature in each of the smooth mechanisms described above is the greediness
of the allocation rule. Indeed, an intuition that arises from this line of work is that greedy
algorithms lend themselves well to auction design, in the sense that they generate smooth
mechanisms that necessarily have good performance at equilibrium. However, to this point,
there is no result of satisfying generality that links greediness with smoothness. The ar-
guments establishing smoothness for each mechanism are subtley tailored to their specific
contexts, despite the intuition of a more general principle. The contribution of this work
is to formalize this intuition and unify the aforementioned results; to show that, in a gen-
eral sense, greedy auctions are smooth. For instance, we unify results on the efficiency of
simultaneous item auctions [Christodoulou et al. 2008; Hassidim et al. 2011], uniform price
auction [Markakis and Telelis 2012] and position auctions with externalities [Roughgarden
and Tardos 2012] in a single argument (albeit with slightly worse constants).
Specifically, we show that if a greedy allocation rule is used to allocate resources subject
to a matroid constraint, and buyers have submodular1 preferences over the resources, then
the resulting mechanism is smooth and will achieve a constant fraction of the optimal
welfare at Nash equilibrium. In other words, the mechanism has constant price of anarchy.
We then show how each of the examples described above, plus others, fall within this
framework. Unsurprisingly, the constants we obtain for the general results are not as tight
as the constants achieved via direct analysis of specific auction instances. Nevertheless, we
view our general result as providing insight into the structural properties of mechanisms
that lead to reasonable approximation guarantees.
Challenges and Techniques. To illustrate the barriers to a general connection between
greediness and smoothness, let us first describe a standard smoothness argument typical of
the recent literature on simple auctions. Consider the following very simple setting: the sale
of a single item via first-price, sealed-bid auction. This is a greedy allocation rule subject
to the (very simple) matroid constraint that at most one bid can be chosen. Suppose agent
i has the maximum value vi for the item, and let B = (b1, . . . , bn) be a bid profile at
equilibrium. We wish to argue that the welfare generated at this equilibrium is close to
OPT , which is vi. To see this, imagine what would happen if agent i deviated to bidding
half of his true value, vi/2. Agent i either wins under this deviation, or he does not. If he
does, then his utility would be vi/2. If he does not, then there must exist some other agent
j that bids more than vi/2, and hence pays at least vi/2 at equilibrium. Either way, we can
conclude that agent i’s utility under the deviation, plus the sum of all agents’ payments at
equilibrium, is at least vi/2. This is precisely the smoothness condition. To deduce a price
of anarchy bound, note that since bid profile B forms an equilibrium, agent i’s utility at
equilibrium must be at least his utility under the deviation. So we can conclude that the
sum of agent utilities at equilibrium, plus the sum of payments at equilibrium, is at least
vi/2. Since the two sums add up to the social welfare at equilibrium, we conclude that the
welfare at equilibrium is at least vi/2, half of the optimal welfare.
The smoothness condition is effectively a charging argument. If agent i’s utility at equi-
librium is low, relative to his welfare in the optimal outcome, then we aim to find an agent
j against whose payment we can charge agent i’s loss in utility. In many cases, like the
one above, the agent to charge against is obvious: for example, the winner of an item that
was “supposed” to go to i in the optimal allocation. However, more generally, finding an
appropriate charging method is not as straightforward, as our next example illustrates.
One technical challenge in extending the argument to arbitrary matroids is to show how to
construct such mappings in general.
1Our results actually hold for the more general class of fractionally subadditive preferences.
Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms A:3
(a) example with a graphi-
cal matroid constraint.
Fig. 1. Sample input instance to a greedy mechanism. Elements are edges, and weights represent agent
values. Each solid edge is being bid on truthfully, each dashed edge has a bid of 0. The feasibility constraint
is a graphical matroid (allocation cannot contain cycles).
Consider the example in Figure 1(a), where elements are the edges in a graph and the
feasibility constraint is the graphical matroid; that is, a set is feasible if it contains no cycles.
Each edge is labeled with a value, and is being bid on by a different agent. The optimal
outcome is {ab, ad, cd}, but the bid profile (where dashed lines get bid 0) results in outcome
{ac, bc, bd}. If the agent bidding on edge ab raised his bid to half of its value, 3, he would lose
this bid; to which equilibrium payment should this loss be charged? A first instinct would be
to charge against edge ad, since that edge sets the critical threshold for whether a bid on ab
would win. However, such a charging scheme would also charge losing bids for edges ad and
cd to edge ac as well, leading to poor smoothness bounds. To avoid such collisions, one must
take a more global view, taking into account all deviations by all players. In this example,
one could charge ab to ac, cd to bd, and ad to bc. To build such a global charging method
for general matroids, we use the Rota Exchange property of matroids, which guarantees the
existence of an appropriate mapping on which to build a charging scheme.
Our Results. Our main result is that any greedy mechanism that allocates resources
subject to a matroid constraint has price of anarchy at most 3 via a smoothness argument.
Main Theorem. Suppose agents desire subsets of a ground set, which can be allocated
subject to a matroid constraint. Suppose further that agent valuations over elements are
fractionally subadditive. Then a mechanism that elicits separate bids on the ground set
elements, then allocates greedily by bid and charges pay-your-bid payments, has Price of
Anarchy at most 3.
Roughly speaking, a mechanism is smooth if, for every valuation profile v, there is an
action profile a∗ such that, for all bid profiles b, the sum of all agent payments (under b) plus
the sum of agent utilities (under unilateral deviations from b to a∗) is at least a constant fac-
tor of the optimal social welfare. To generalize previous smoothness arguments to arbitrary
matroid environments, we must find a general method to charge losing bids (under devia-
tion a∗) to agent payments (under b), as described above. We make use of the well-known
Rota exchange property of matroids to build the necessary mappings. Mapping in hand,
we employ a method of declared-welfare maximization recently developed in [Babaioff et al.
2014], paired with the composition framework of [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013], to establish
the claimed smoothness condition.
We next show that our result can be extended to handle polymatroid constraints. A formal
definition of polymatroids appears in Section 3.1. Roughly speaking, a polymatroid allows
fractional allocations of goods, subject to submodular constraints on the total allocated
quantities of different subsets of goods. We actually provide two different forms of this
extension. First, if each agent’s value for a good is linear in the amount of the good she
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receives, then we consider a greedy mechanism that asks agents to report their per-unit
value of each good, then allocates the goods greedily. Second, we consider more general
valuations that can be arbitrary submodular functions over the space of feasible allocations;
in particular, they needn’t be linear for a single good. For this setting, we modify our
mechanism to extend the bidding language slightly: it elicits from each agent a bid on
each element of the ground set, where the bid includes a declared value per unit of the
element, plus a maximum amount of the element that the agent is willing to accept. One
can then consider the greedy allocation rule, which maximizes resources greedily subject
to the polymatroid contraint, up to the declared caps. For both extensions, our analysis
applies and we show that the greedy mechanism has a price of anarchy of at most 3.
Our main theorem and extensions can be applied to a variety of auction settings, such
as sponsored search auctions and combinatorial auctions. We discuss these applications in
Section 4.
We then turn to matching constraints, where the elements for sale are edges in a bipartite
graph and an allocation is feasible only if no two allocated edges are coincident. This is a
special case of the intersection of two matroids. For this case we again show a constant price
of anarchy via smoothness analysis, though this proof is more technically involved and we
obtain a bound of 8.2
We conjecture that our results extend to the intersection of two arbitrary matroids, and
perhaps even to the intersection of k matroids (with a price of anarchy bound of O(k)).
As progress toward understanding matroid intersections, we show that if the feasibility
constraint is the intersection of k matroids and the optimal allocation rule is used on the
bids (rather than the greedy rule), then the price of anarchy is indeed O(k). We emphasize
here that this analysis is very different from that of different “optimal” allocation methods,
such as the VCG mechanism. In particular, the allocation rule is being applied to a restricted
bidding space, where agents must place separate bids on each item; the allocation returned
is the optimal allocation for the bids, which necessarily describe only additive valuations.
Other Related Work. Our results are similar in spirit to Borodin and Lucier [Lucier and
Borodin 2010], who also consider the price of anarchy of greedy mechanisms. They show that
for a class of combinatorial auction problems, any c-approximate greedy algorithm has price
of anarchy O(c) when paired with a first-price payment rule. Our results are incomparable
to theirs: they do not impose requirements on the feasibility constraints or the agents’
valuation classes, but they allow only greedy algorithms in which agents bid directly on
their outcomes (e.g., a package of items in a combinatorial auction). Since our analysis
doesn’t impose this last requirement, it applies to a wider array of greedy mechanisms, such
as combinatorial auctions that allocate individual items or generalized sponsored search
auctions that don’t require customers to bid directly on slots.
Babaioff, Lucier, Nisan, and Paes Leme [Babaioff et al. 2014] give a general price of
anarchy analysis for “declared welfare maximizing” mechanisms, which collect bids (from a
potentially limited bidding space) and then allocate optimally with respect to the bids. Our
greedy mechanism for matroids is a declared welfare maximizer, but our analysis applies to
a more general space of feasibility conditions; the analysis of [Babaioff et al. 2014] is specific
to combinatorial auction constraints. That said, portions of our proofs apply techniques in
a spirit similar to [Babaioff et al. 2014].
Bikhchandani et al. [Bikhchandani et al. 2011] design an ascending-price Vickrey-style
auction for selling elements of a matroid. Their setting is identical to our own, except that
2 The technical difficulties we encounter bear some similarities to the independent work of Kesselheim et al.
[Kesselheim et al. 2014] who consider an auction setting that involves matroid constraints. They consider a
greedy mechanism on the intersection of a unit-partition matroid and a separate matroid constraint for each
player. This result is incomparable to ours, as we provide bounds for greedy algorithms on the intersection
of two unit-partition matroids, i.e. matchings.
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it is assumed that agent values are additive over the elements they receive. They show that
their mechanism is welfare-optimal and has a variety of desireable incentive properties. Our
work extends their setting to the case of more general valuations, where greedy allocation
rules are not necessarily incentive compatible.
2. PRELIMINARIES
A principal wants to decide an allocation of resources to n players. The principal has to
choose an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) among a set of feasible allocation vectors X that is a
subset of a product space of allocations X ⊆ X1 × . . .× Xn. We assume that the principal
can also ask the players to pay for their allocation and thereby he also needs to decide a
payment vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+.
Each player i, has a valuation function that maps an allocation to some non-negative
real number: vi : Xi → R+. We will denote with Vi the set of allowed valuations for player
i and with V = V1 × . . . × Vn the set of allowed valuation profiles. If a player is given
allocation xi and is asked to pay pi, then her utility is quasi-linear with respect to money:
ui(xi, pi; vi) = vi(xi)− pi.
Definition 2.1 (Mechanism). A mechanism M is a tuple (A, X, P ), where A =
A1 × . . . × An and Ai is a set of actions available to player i, X : A → ∆(X ) is an
allocation function that maps each action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) to a distribution over
feasible allocation vectors and P : A → ∆(Rn+) is a payment function that maps each action
profile to a distribution over payment vectors.
We will denote with Xi and Pi the i-th coordinate of the allocation and payment functions
respectively and with UMi : ∆(A)×Vi → R the expected utility of player i from mechanism
M. That is, UMi (a; vi) = Ea,Xi(a),Pi(a) [vi (Xi(a))− Pi (a)]. We will also denote the expected
revenue of the mechanism as RM(a) = ∑i∈[n] Ea,Pi(a)[Pi(a)].
Efficiency. We will denote with SW : A × V → R+, the social welfare produced by
the mechanism under some action profile: SWM(a; v) =
∑
i∈[n] EXi(a)[vi (Xi(a))]. For any
valuation profile v ∈ V we will denote with x∗(v) the optimal allocation, i.e. the allocation
that maximizes welfare over all feasible allocations x ∈ X and we will denote with Opt(v) =∑
i∈[n] vi(x
∗
i (v)).
Definition 2.2 (Smooth Mechanism [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]). A mecha-
nism M is (λ, µ)-smooth for some λ, µ ≥ 0, if for any valuation profile v ∈ V and for
each player i ∈ [n] there exists a randomized action a∗i (v), such that for any action profile
a ∈ A: ∑
i∈[n] U
M
i (a
∗
i (v), a−i; vi) ≥ λ ·Opt(v)− µ · RM(a) (1)
Definition 2.3 (Smooth Mechanism via Swap Deviations). A mechanism M is
(λ, µ)-smooth via swap deviations if for any valuation profile v ∈ V, there exists a mapping
a∗i (v, ·) : Ai → ∆(Ai), such that for any action profile a ∈ A:∑
i∈[n] U
M
i (a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i; vi) ≥ λOpt(v)− µRM(a) (2)
We refer the reader to [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] for properties of smooth mechanisms.
Roughly if a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth, then every equilibrium has social welfare at least
λ
max{1,µ} of the optimal (i.e. the price of anarchy (PoA) is at most
max{1,µ}
λ ) and this ex-
tends to no-regret learning outcomes, incomplete information, simultaneous and sequentially
occurring mechanisms and budget constraints.
Combinatorial Allocation Spaces and Greedy Mechanisms.. Consider the following instan-
tiation of the mechanism design setting: the allocation space Xi of each player i consists of
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the power set of a finite set of elements Ei which we will refer to as the ground elements
of player i. Hence, each bidder i’s valuation is a set function vi : 2
Ei → R+ which maps an
allocation Si ⊆ Ei to a value vi(Si). We will be primarily interested in the case where this
function is XOS, i.e. can be expressed as a maximum over a set of additive valuations (see
Lehmann et al. [Lehmann et al. 2001]), which is a superset of submodular valuations.
We denote with E = E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En the set of all ground elements. The outcome of the
mechanism is a subset S ⊆ E of this ground set and thereby the allocation of each player is
Si = S ∪Ei. We assume that there is some feasibility constraint F ⊆ 2E defined on E , which
defines which subsets S ⊆ E are feasible. The outcome of the mechanism is restricted to fall
within F .
Greedy Mechanism on Reported Bids. We consider the following mechanism: from each
player i, the auctioneer solicits bids bt for each t ∈ Ei, i.e. Ai = R|Ei|+ . We will denote with
ai = (bt)t∈Ei an action of player i and with b = (bt)t∈E a bid profile on all elements. The
auctioneer runs the greedy algorithm on the reported bid profile to decide which elements
of E are to be picked, i.e. elements are considered in decreasing ordered of bids and each
element is added to the outcome as long as it is feasible. Each player is asked to pay his bid
for each of his elements in his allocation.
3. SMOOTHNESS FOR MATROID FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS
We now proceed to the main result of the paper. Consider the case where the feasibility
constraint F , is the collection I of independent sets of a matroid M = (E , I) (see Schrijver
[Schrijver 2003] for an extensive exposition of matroids), defined on the ground set. We
show that the greedy mechanism on reported bids is a
(
1
3 , 1
)
-smooth mechanism. To show
the smoothness property we will heavily use an exchange property of matroid feasibility
constraints, proved by Lee et al. [Lee et al. 2010].
Lemma 3.1 (Generalized Rota Exchange [Lee et al. 2010]). Let M = (E , I) be
a matroid and A,B ∈ I. Let A1, ..., An be subsets of A such that each element of A appears
in exactly q of them. Then there are sets B1, ..., Bm ⊆ B such that each element of B
appears in at most q of them, and for each i, Ai ∪ (B/ Bi) ∈ I.
Theorem 3.2. The greedy mechanism on reported bids is a ( 13 , 1)-smooth mechanism
when the valuation of each player is XOS. Hence, every equilibrium achieves at least 1/3
of the optimal welfare.
We will use the following Lemma, which is a re-interpretation of the results of [Syrgkanis
and Tardos 2013]):
Lemma 3.3 (Syrgkanis and Tardos [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]). If a mecha-
nism is (λ, µ)-smooth for a class of valuations V, then the same mechanism is also (λ, µ)-
smooth for the class of valuations max−V, defined as all valuations v, that can be expressed
as the maximum over a set of valuations from V: v(S) = max`∈L v`(S), for some arbitrary
potentially infinite index set L.
Since XOS are by definition valuations that can be expressed as a maximum over a set of
additive valuations, it suffices to show that the mechanism is smooth for additive valuations,
which we show in the following Lemma and which is the main technical part of the theorem.
Lemma 3.4. The greedy mechanism on reported bids is a ( 13 , 1)-smooth mechanism when
the valuation of each player is additive.
Proof. Consider an additive valuation profile v, i.e. vi(Si) =
∑
t∈Si wt. Let S
∗ be the
optimal base for valuation profile v and S∗i = S
∗∩Ei, be player i’s allocation in the optimal
base. Suppose that each player i deviates to a∗i =
(
wt
α
)
t∈Ei .
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Consider an action profile a, where ai = (bt)t∈Ei , and let S, be the selected set under
action profile a. Let a′ = (a∗i , a−i), be the induced action profile and S
′ be the set allocated
after the deviation and S′i = S
′ ∩ Ei.
We denote with W (S, a) =
∑
t∈S bt, the. By Lemma 3.1 for q = 1, we have that there
exist disjoint sets T1, . . . , Tn of S, such that Q = S
∗
i ∪ (S − Ti) ∈ I. By optimality of the
greedy algorithm on the reported bid profile and since Q is feasible, we have:∑
t∈S′i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S′−S′i
bt ≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S−Ti−Ei
bt +
∑
t∈(S∩Ei)−Ti
wt
α
≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S−Ti−Ei
bt
By optimality of the algorithm on the initial bid profile we have:∑
t∈S bt = W (S, a) ≥W (S′, a) =
∑
t∈S′ bt ≥
∑
t∈S′−S′i bt
Combining we get:∑
t∈S′i
wt
α
≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S−Ti−Ei
bt −
∑
t∈S
bt =
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
−
∑
t∈S∩(Ti∪Ei)
bt
≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
−
∑
t∈S∩Ti
bt −
∑
t∈S∩Ei
bt
Observe that by definition the utility of the player under the deviation is: UMi (a
∗
i , a−i; vi) =(
1− 1α
)∑
t∈S′i wt. Using the previous inequalities we can lower bound his utility as follows:
UMi (a
∗
i , a−i; vi) =
(
1− 1
α
)∑
t∈S′i
wt
≥
(
1− 1
α
) ∑
t∈S∗i
wt −
(
1− 1
α
)
· α ·
( ∑
t∈S∩Ti
bt +
∑
t∈S∩Ei
bt
)
Summing over all players:∑
i
UMi (a
∗
i , a−i; vi) ≥
(
1− 1
α
)
Opt(v)−
(
1− 1
α
)
· α ·
(∑
i
∑
t∈S∩Ti
bt +
∑
i
∑
t∈S∩Ei
bt
)
≥
(
1− 1
α
)
Opt(v)− (α− 1) · 2
∑
t∈S
bt
where the last inequality follows, since Ti are disjoint sets and thereby
∑
i
∑
t∈S∩Ti bt ≤∑
t∈S bt. By setting α =
1
2 + 1 =
3
2 , yields the result.
3.1. Action Space Restrictions and Extension to Polymatroids
We examine the generalization of Theorem 3.2 to polymatroids. In a polymatroid setting,
each element t ∈ Ei corresponds to a divisible good. The allocation Xi = R|Ei|+ of a player
is the vector of allocated units from each element t ∈ Ei: xi = (xt)t∈Ei . The mechanism
chooses a vector of allocated units of each element: x = (xt)t∈E ∈ R|E|+ . This vector has to
satisfy a polymatroid constraint: for any S ⊆ E , ∑t∈S xt ≤ f(S), and f(·) is a monotone
submodular function with f(∅) = 0.
The valuation of a player is linear across elements and is homogeneous for each element,
i.e. vi(xi) =
∑
t∈Ei wt · xt. We show that the greedy mechanism, described in Mechanism 1,
is smooth.
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Mechanism 1: Polymatroid mechanism.
1 From each player i solicit bids bt for each t ∈ Ei. Denote with ai = (bt)t∈Ei and b = (bt)t∈E
2 Run the greedy polymatroid algorithm with weights b to decide the final allocation x, i.e. at each
iteration pick element t from remaining with maximum bt and increase xt until some polymatroid
constraint becomes tight. Then remove t from consideration.
3 Charge each player i,
∑
t∈Ei bt · xt.
Theorem 3.5. The polymatroid mechanism is
(
1
3 , 1
)
-smooth when players have linear
and homogeneous valuations. (proof in Appendix A.1)
The proof of Theorem 3.5 is based on the observation that, by discretizing the allocation
space, we can view the polymatroid mechanism as the limit of a greedy matroid mechanism,
where the players are restricted to submit the same bid on all units derived from the
discretization of a good. Then the theorem follows essentially from Theorem 3.4 by making
the following generic observation on smooth mechanisms: if we restrict the action space of
a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism, such that the smoothness deviations fall within the restricted
action space, then the restricted mechanism is still (λ, µ)-smooth. Since the smoothness
deviation of Theorem 3.4 is simply a scaled version of a player’s true value, and the value of
a player is homogeneous for each good, we get that this deviation remains in the restricted
space of the discretized matroid mechanism, proving smoothness of each discretized version
and thereby of the limit polymatroid mechanism.
Submodular valuations. Suppose that each player’s value vi(xi) is a monotone submodular
function on the euclidean lattice defined on R|Ei|+ . Then from [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013],
we know that it can be expressed as: vi(xi) = max`∈L
∑
t∈Ei vt(xt), with vt(·) being an in-
creasing concave function. Since, it is easy to see that every increasing concave function can
be expressed as the maximum of functions that are linear up to a point and then constant:
i.e. vt(xt) = max`∈L w`t min{xt, q`t}, we can conclude that any submodular valuation can be
written as vi(xi) = max`∈L
∑
t∈Ei w
`
t ·min{xt, q`t}. for some index set L. Thus in order to
prove smoothness of the polymatroid mechanism, by Lemma 3.3 it suffices to show smooth-
ness for the following much simpler class of valuations: vi(xi) =
∑
t∈Ei wt ·min{xt, qt}.
To render the polymatroid mechanism smooth, we introduce the following modification
of the polymatroid mechanism under which the player can also submit allocation capacities
for each good.
Mechanism 2: Polymatroid mechanism with capacities.
1 From each player i solicit a bid bt and a capacity qt for each t ∈ Ei. Denote with ai = (bt)t∈Ei and
b = (bt)t∈E and q = (qt)t∈E
2 Run the greedy polymatroid algorithm with weights b and capacities qt to decide the final
allocation x, i.e. at each iteration pick element t from remaining with maximum bt and increase
xt until some polymatroid constraint becomes tight or xt reaches qt. Then remove t from
consideration.
3 Charge each player i,
∑
t∈Ei bt · xt.
Corollary 3.6. The polymatroid mechanism with capacities is
(
1
3 , 1
)
-smooth when
players have submodular valuations. (proof in Appendix A.1)
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4. APPLICATIONS
We start by observing that the mechanism design setting with matroid feasibility constraints
is the same as the setting analyzed by Bikhchandani et al. [Bikhchandani et al. 2011] and
therefore it can be applied to the plethora of applications identified there. These include:
scheduling matroids of Demange et al. [Demange et al. 1986], uniform matroids which
can capture the sale of a homogeneous good to bidders with decreasing marginal values
(see e.g. the discriminatory analog of the uniform price auction studied in [Syrgkanis and
Tardos 2013]), transversal matroids that can capture pairwise Kidney exchanges [Roth
2005]. Additionally, the polymatroid result has applications in the spatially distributed
markets of Babaioff et al. [Babaioff et al. 2009]. For a more detailed exposition of these
applications see Section 5 of [Bikhchandani et al. 2011].
In all these settings, our results shows that the very simple greedy first price mechanism
achieves at least 1/3 of the optimal allocation. Note that when these examples are discussed
in [Bikhchandani et al. 2011], the valuations of players are assumed to be linear; our results
apply to these allocations but allow more generally for agents to have XOS valuations over
the elements for sale, as in the scheduling example described at the beginning of the paper.
Simultaneous Item Auctions. Another application of our setting is that of the simultane-
ous first price item-bidding auction. The simultaneous item bidding auction among m items
can be seen as matroid mechanism on a matroid of n ·m elements, where each element cor-
responds to a (player, item) pair. Each player controls the m elements in which he appears,
one for each of the items. The feasibility constraint is that, for every item, only one of the
elements containing that item can be in the outcome set, which is a matroid feasibility
constraint. Note that the simultaneous first price item-bidding mechanism corresponds to
the greedy first price mechanism on this matroid setting.
Ad Auctions Polytope. Our polymatroid result finds interesting application in the case of
ad auctions. By Goel et al [Goel et al. 2012] the following setting can be represented as a
polymatroid: there are multiple keywords and each keyword j has k slots available. Each slot
(j, k) is associated with a number of clicks aj,k. A set of players is competing for the clicks.
Each player has a per-click value vi and his value is vi ·xi, where xi is the number of clicks he
got, i.e. if k(i, j) is the position he won at keyword j, then xi =
∑
j kj,k(i,j). The feasibility
constraints in the above setting can be expressed as a polymatroid and therefore the greedy
polymatroid mechanism yields a smooth mechanism. Note that the greedy polymatroid
mechanism in this setting is to run independent Generalized First Price auctions for each
keyword. In fact, our mechanism can handle the case where players have different valuations
for different keywords, i.e.
∑
j vijaj,k(i,j). In this case, each keyword is a different coordinate
of the polymatroid. The mechanism again corresponds to running a Generalized First Price
auction, but now the players can submit a bid bij for each keyword j.
Our polymatroid mechanism with capacities can also have applications if the valuations
of the players are submodular over the allocated clicks from each keyword. However, the
mechanism would not correspond to running GFP on each keyword. Instead, the mecha-
nism would asks also for capacities of the players and then randomize over the allocation
of positions so as in expectation a player is never allocated more than his declared click
capacity.
Ad Auctions with Externalities. As an illustration of the power of the polymatroid for-
mulation, we revisit a model of sponsored search ad auctions with externalities studied by
Roughgarden and Tardos [Roughgarden and Tardos 2012]. Like the Ad Auction setting
above, there are k slots; for simplicity assume there is only one keyword. Each advertiser
has a per-click value vi, but also a click probability pi and a continuation probability qi.
Rather than presuming that each slot has a click probability, these probabilities arise as
follows: given an assignment of ads to slots, a user will begin scanning the list of ads from
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slot 1 to slot k. Upon encountering an ad i, say in slot j, it will click the ad with probability
pi. Also, with probability qi the user will continue scanning to the next slot; otherwise, with
probability 1 − qi the user will terminate and not view any subsequent ads. Thus, if we
write α(j) for the ad assigned to slot j, then the total value of an ad i assigned to slot ` is
vipi
∏
j<` qα(j).
In [Roughgarden and Tardos 2012] it is shown that an auction that assigns ads to slots
greedily by vipi1−qi and charges threshold payments has a price of anarchy of at most 4. We
will describe how to interpret this setting as a polymatroid auction, and our results will then
imply a price of anarchy of 3 for a first price variant. Our result price of anarchy of 3 for
polymatroid auctions, though phrased for first price payments, can also be easily adapted
to give a price of anarchy of at most 6 for any second price variant, assuming players do
not bid above their valuation.3 Thus our polymatroid result directly implies a constant
approximation for the auction analysed in [Roughgarden and Tardos 2012].
Denote with xi the probability that ad i is the last ad scanned. Then advertiser i obtains
expected value vipi1−qi · xi. We can therefore write Vi =
vipi
1−qi , and then view the auction
as allocating the probabilities xi to bidders with modified values Vi. We now claim that
the set allocation profiles x corresponding to valid assignments forms a polymatroid, with
constraints given by
∑
t∈S xt ≤ 1−
∏
t∈S qt. To see that the conditions are necessary, note
that the probability that any ad in set S is the last scanned is maximized when the ads in
S occupy the lowest-indexed slots, in which case the probability is precisely 1 −∏t∈S qt.
For sufficiency, note that any deterministic assignment certainly satisfies these constraints
(consider all prefixes of the assignment), and hence any mixture of assignments would as
well. Last observe that the function f(S) = 1−∏t∈S qt is a monotone submodular function
and therefore the polytope defined by these constraints is a polymatroid.
Since the setting can be framed as a polymatroid auction with values given by vipi1−qi , we
can conclude that a greedy auction that allocates in order of vipi1−qi is (
1
3 , 1)-smooth.
5. SMOOTHNESS FOR MATROID INTERSECTIONS
We now turn to more complex feasibility constraints. We start by showing that the greedy
algorithm leads to a smooth mechanism via swap deviations, for constant λ and µ, even when
the feasibility constraint corresponds to a matching constraint: i.e. each ground element
t ∈ E corresponds to an edge (ut, vt) in a bipartite graph (U, V, E) which is an intersection
of two partition matroids ([Schrijver 2003]).
Then we turn to the intersection of arbitrary k matroids and we show that running
the optimal algorithm (which in general is an NP-hard problem) rather than the greedy
algorithm yields a smooth mechanism, whose parameters λ and µ degrade with k. We
conjecture that similar behavior holds for the greedy algorithm, but we leave it as an open
question for future research.
Conjecture 5.1. The PoA is O(k) for the greedy mechanism when the feasibility con-
straint is the intersection of k matroids.
5.1. Matchings and Greedy Allocation
We present the smoothness theorem for matching feasibility constraints. Unlike the matroid
setting where we used the existing machinery of Generalized Rota exchanges to create a
charging argument, in this setting there is no analogous machinery for the greedy algorithm.
Hence, we construct a charging argument that allows us to show that from a deviation either
3A fairly standard, in the literature, modification in the proof of our main theorem to show that the auction
is weakly (1/3, 1)-smooth as defined in [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013], which implies a bound of 6 on the price
of anarchy
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(a) example with a matching constraint.
Fig. 2. Sample input instance to a greedy mechanisms. Elements are edges, and weights represent agent
values. Each solid edge is being bid on truthfully, each dashed edge has a bid of 0. There is a matching
constraint: no edges that share an edge can be simultaneously allocated.
a player gets high utility or some part of the revenue at equilibrium is high. Moreover, each
part of the equilibrium revenue is not charged more than twice by our charging scheme.
Let us spend a moment to illustrate the difficulty inherent in constructing such mappings,
Consider the matching instance described in Figure 2(a), where the elements are the edges
of the graph and the feasibility constraint is that no two allocated edges can share a vertex.
Each edge is labeled with a value, and we consider a bid profile where the bids on dashed
edges are set to 0. The optimal outcome is {aA, bD}, and the outcome of the bid profile is
{aB, bC, cD}. Suppose a single agent, agent 1, is the one bidding on edges aA and bD. Say
agent 1 were to switch to declaring half of his value for each of those two edges. Then he
would win edge aA, but the next edge chosen by the greedy algorithm would be bB, and
edge bD would not be chosen. To which edge should the loss of edge bD be charged? It
cannot be edge bB, since that edge isn’t present in the equilibrium outcome, so its payment
is not part of the equilibrium payment. It also cannot be bC or cD, since their payments
are not large enough. In this example, one could charge against edge aB, even though that
edge doesn’t share a vertex with bD. The heart of our analysis of greedy algorithms under
a matching constraint is the design of a “long-range” charging scheme that generalizes the
scenario described in this example.
We ultimately obtain the following smoothness condition on greedy mechanisms subject
to matching constraints.
Theorem 5.2. The greedy mechanism is
(
1
2 , 4
)
-smooth via swap deviations when valu-
ations are additive and the feasibility constraint is a matching constraint.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and an action profile a with corresponding bid
profile b and let S be the set output by the greedy algorithm on action profile a. Suppose
that each player i deviates to bidding the pointwise maximum of ai and a
′
i =
(
wt
2
)
t∈S∗i
. This
is a valid swap deviation according to definition 2.3. Let a′ = (a′i, a−i) be the action profile
when player i deviates and b′ the corresponding bid profile. Let S′ be the set allocated after
the deviation and let S′i = S
′ ∩ Ei.
Write Ai = S
∗
i ∩ S′i and Ui = S∗i − S′i. (So Ai is the set of optimal items for agent i that
are allocated under S′, and Ui are those that are unallocated). We have:
UMi (a
′
i, a−i; vi) ≥
∑
t∈Ai
(
wt −max
{wt
2
, bt
})
≥ 1
2
∑
t∈Ai
wt −
∑
t∈Ai
bt ≥ 1
2
∑
t∈Ai
wt −
∑
t∈S∗i
bt.
So ∑
i
UMi (a
′
i, a−i; vi) ≥
1
2
∑
i
∑
t∈Ai
wt −
∑
i
∑
t∈S∗i
bt =
1
2
∑
i
∑
t∈Ai
wt −
∑
t∈S∗
bt.
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Since S∗ is a feasible allocation and S is the outcome of the greedy algorithm on matchings,
then by the well known 2-approximation guarantee of the algorithm we have
∑
t∈S∗ bt ≤
2
∑
t∈S bt. Combining with the inequality above, this yields
∑
i U
M
i (a
′
i, a−i; vi) ≥
1
2
∑
i
∑
t∈Ai wt − 2
∑
t∈S bt.
We claim (proved below) that there exists a mapping φ : (∪iUi) → S such that bφ(t) ≥
1
2wt for all t ∈ (∪iUi), and moreover |φ−1(x)| ≤ 2 for all x ∈ Sg. This will imply that
2
∑
x∈S bx ≥ 12
∑
i
∑
t∈Ui wt. We can then establish the smoothness property:∑
i
UMi (a
′
i, a−i; vi) ≥
1
2
∑
i
∑
t∈Ai
wt − 2
∑
x∈S
bx +
1
2
∑
i
∑
t∈Ui
wt − 2
∑
x∈S
bx
=
1
2
Opt(v)− 4
∑
x∈S
bx
Construction of charging mapping.. It remains to construct the promised mapping φ. We
first introduce the notion of an exchange graph for sets that are in the intersection of two
matroids M1 = (E , I1) and M2 = (E , I2):
Definition 5.3 (Exchange Graph). For a set S ⊂ I1 ∩ I2, the exchange graph for
S is a directed bipartite graph G(S) with node sets S and E − S such that: for v ∈ S and
u ∈ E\S, we have edge (v, u) if S − v + u ∈ I1, and edge (u, v) if S − v + u ∈ I2.
In a matching, a set of elements is in an independent set of matroid M1 if no two elements
have the same left endpoint in the bipartite graph (U, V, E), while it is an independent set
of matroid M2, if no two elements have the same right endpoint. Then a feasible set of
the mechanism can be viewed as the intersection of these two matroids. We now provide
some extra properties of the exchange graph in the special case of a matching feasibility
constraint.
Observation 5.4. Given S ∈ I1 ∩ I2 and t ∈ E − S, there is at most one s ∈ S such
that (s, t) ∈ G(S) and at most one s′ ∈ S such that (t, s′) ∈ G(S).
Observation 5.5. Given S ∈ I1 ∩ I2, T ∈ I1 ∩ I2, and s ∈ S, there is at most one
t ∈ T − S such that (s, t) ∈ G(S) and at most one t′ ∈ T − S such that (t′, s) ∈ G(S).
Next we argue about the structure of S′, by way of G(S). We remind that S is the greedy
outcome under bid profile b and S′ is the greedy outcome under bid profile b′ produced by
action profile a′ = (a′i, a−i). We also remind that the bids in b
′ are the same as the bids in
b with only some elements T ∈ I1 ∩ I2 having an increased bid.
Lemma 5.6. There exist paths pi1, . . . , pi` in G(S) such that:
(1 ) in each path, the bids b′t on the nodes are either monotonically increasing or decreasing,
(2 ) in each path, the node with maximum bid from b′ is the unique element of T −S on the
path,
(3 ) the paths are disjoint, except that each t ∈ T could be the maximum-b′ element for at
most one increasing (in b′) path and one decreasing (in b′) path, and
(4 ) S′ is precisely S with all nodes from S ∩ (∪ipii) removed and all nodes from S − (∪ipii)
added.
Proof. Let Hk be the top k elements from E with respect to bids B′ (breaking ties in
the same manner as the greedy algorithm). We will prove the stronger result that, for each
k, our lemma holds for the sets S ∩Hk and S′ ∩Hk (in item number 4). The proof will be
by induction on k. Taking k = |E| will then give the stated lemma.
For the base case k = 1, let x be the single element in H1. If x 6∈ T then bx = b′x and
hence S ∩ H1 = {x} = S′ ∩ H1 so the result holds trivially. If x ∈ T and x ∈ S then the
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result again holds trivially. If x ∈ T but x 6∈ S, then we have S∩H1 = ∅ but S′∩H1 = {x}.
In this case, take path P1 to be the singleton node {x} to get the desired result.
Now consider k > 1. By induction, there are paths pi1, . . . , pi` with the required properties
for S ∩Hk−1 and S′ ∩Hk−1. Let x be the single element in Hk −Hk−1. If x is in both S
and S′, or in neither, then paths pi1, . . . , pi` satisfy the required properties.
Suppose x ∈ S but x 6∈ S′. Then, since x 6∈ S′, there exists some element y ∈ S′−S such
that b′y ≥ b′x and either (x, y) or (y, x) is in G(S). Assume (x, y) ∈ G(S), as the other case is
symmetric. Since y is considered before x by the greedy algorithm on a′, we have y ∈ Hk−1.
So y must lie on a path pii. From our earlier observation, there can be no x
′ ∈ S, x′ 6= x,
such that (x′, y) ∈ G(S). Thus, either y is the maximum-a′ element of pii, pii is decreasing
and no increasing path ending at y, or else y is the endpoint of pii with lowest bid a
′. In
either case, extending pii by appending x retains the required properties of our paths.
Finally, suppose x 6∈ S but x ∈ S′. If x ∈ T then create a new path containing only the
singleton x, and we are done. Otherwise, there must be some element y ∈ S − S′ such that
by ≥ bx (and hence b′y ≥ b′x, since x 6∈ T ) and either (x, y) or (y, x) is in G(S). Assume
(x, y) ∈ G(S), as the other case is symmetric. This case is now similar to the previous case.
Since y is considered before x by the greedy algorithm on a, and hence on a′, we have
y ∈ Hk−1. So y must lie on a path pii. From our earlier observation, there can be no x′ ∈ S′,
x′ 6= x, such that (x′, y) ∈ G(S) (since S′ is in I1 ∩ I2). Thus y is an endpoint of a path
pii. Since it cannot be the maximum-a
′ endpoint of the path, it is the endpoint of pii with
lowest-a′ bid. In either case, extending pii by appending x retains the required properties of
our paths.
So, in all cases, the required paths exist for this value of k. The result follows by induction.
Finally, we argue about properties of elements not allocated by the greedy algorithm
when their bids are increased. As before, fix a bid profile b and greedy outcome S for b, and
suppose bid profile b′ is b with increased bids on some set of elements T ∈ I1 ∩ I2. Let S′
be the greedy outcome for b′.
Lemma 5.7. Suppose t ∈ T −S′. Then t is adjacent (in G(S)) to some x ∈ S such that
either
(1 ) bx ≥ b′t, or
(2 ) x 6∈ S′ and x lies on a path pii (from Lemma 5.6) with a neighbor y 6∈ T such that
b′y ≥ b′t, or
(3 ) x 6∈ S′ and x has a neighbor y 6∈ T in G(S) such that y is the endpoint of a path pii (from
the previous lemma) and b′y ≥ b′t. Moreover, the path pii is increasing if (x, t) ∈ G(S)
and decreasing if (t, x) ∈ G(S).
Proof. If t = (α, β) 6∈ S′, there must exist some y ∈ S′ with b′z ≥ b′t and y conflicting
(i.e., shares a vertex with) with t (wlog let it be vertex α). If y ∈ S then take x = y and
we’re done. Let’s assume that this is not the case and Condition 1 is not true.
Then, we have y ∈ S′−S, so our previous lemma states that z lies on a path pii with the
appropriate properties. Since y shares vertex α with t, we can take x to be the element of
S that also shares this vertex. Then (x, y) and (x, t) are in G(S), and moreover x 6∈ S′. If
y is the endpoint of path pii then we are done, since Condition 3 is satisfied.
Otherwise, it must be that the path pii continues. We need to argue that the path is
increasing and that (x, y) is part of the path. If the path was decreasing then it means
that there exists some edge (x′, y) such that b′x′ ≥ b′y. Thus x′ shares vertex α with y and
hence with t. Moreover, for this reason x′ 6∈ T and therefore b′x = bx. Thus condition 1 is
satisfied, with x = x′, a contradiction to our first assumption. So it must be that the path
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is increasing and hence an edge (r, y) is part of the path. But from Observation 5.4 the only
such r is x. Thus Condition 2 is satisfied.
We’re now ready to define our promised mapping φ : ∪iUi → S. Take T = S∗i in the
above Lemmas. Note Ui = T − S′. For each t ∈ T − S′, if Condition 1 of Lemma 5.7 is
satisfied then take φ(t) = x, for the x in the condition. If Conditions 2 or 3 of Lemma 5.7
are satisfied then we first create a temporary association, based on which we subsequently
construct the mapping. If Condition 2 of Lemma 5.7 is satisfied then we associate t with the
x in the condition, whilst if Condition 3 is satisfied then we associate t with the endpoint y.
Then each x ∈ S is associated with only one t, since each such x lies on a unique path, and
the neighbor from T with which it’s associated is determined by the direction of that path.
Moreover, each endpoint of a path y is associated with only one other node t, since y lies on
a unique path and the node t with which it is associated is determined by the monotonicity
of the path.
Now define φ(t) as follows: starting from the node x associated with t, follow the path in
the direction of increasing b′ until reaching some x′ ∈ S that is either (a) associated with
some other node t′ ∈ T , or (b) the last element of S along the path. In either case, we will
set φ(t) = x′. Note that b′x′ ≥ b′t, since by construction b′x′ ≥ b′y ≥ b′t. Moreover, x′ 6∈ T by
the observation that x′ is adjacent to (and hence conflicts with) some x ∈ T in graph G(S).
Thus bx = b
′
x ≥ b′t as required.
We must argue that this mapping φ satisfies the required properties. We already have
that bφ(t) ≥ b′t ≥ wt2 for each t. We next argue that |φ−1(x)| ≤ 2 for each x ∈ S. This follows
because each x is mapped-to at most once for each of its (two) adjacent elements t ∈ S∗. If
bx is greater than b
′
t, then x is mapped-to directly from t. If bx is less than b
′
t then x can
potentially be mapped to via an association with t along the (at most one) path containing
x, but only by one other element t′ (i.e., corresponding to the next-lowest element along
that path that has an association). Hence, the mapping φ satisfies the required properties,
completing the proof of Theorem 5.2.
5.2. Intersections of Matroids and Optimal Algorithm
We now analyze the mechanism where instead of running the greedy algorithm over the
reported bid profile, we run the optimal algorithm to decide the outcome set. Then each
player is charged his bid for his allocated set. We refer to this mechanism as the optimal
mechanism with first prices.
Theorem 5.8. The optimal mechanism with first prices is a
(
1
k+2 , 1
)
-smooth mech-
anism when valuations are XOS and the feasibility constraint on the ground set is the
intersection of k matroids.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 it suffices to prove the theorem for additive valuations. Consider
an additive valuation profile v. Suppose that each player i deviates to a∗i =
(
wt
α
)
t∈Ei . Let
S∗ be the optimal base for valuation profile v and S∗i = S
∗ ∩ Ei, be player i’s allocation in
the optimal base.
Consider an action profile a, where ai = (bt)t∈Ei , and let S, be the selected set under
action profile a. Let a′ = (a∗i , a−i), be the induced action profile and S
′ be the set allocated
after the deviation and S′i = S
′ ∩ Ei.
Suppose that the feasibility constraint on the elements of the ground set is the intersection
of k matroid constraints, M1, . . . ,Mk. By Lemma 3.1 applied to every matroid Mt = (E , It),
we have that there exist disjoint sets T t1 , . . . , T
t
n such that S
∗
i ∪(S−T ti ) ∈ It. Thus it is easy
to see that: Q = S∗i ∪
(
S − ∪kt=1T ti
) ∈ ∩kt=1It is a feasible set. Let Ti = ∪kt=1T ti , observe
that since for each t ∈ [k], T t1 , . . . , T tn, are disjoint sets, an element appears in at most k of
the sets T1, . . . , Tn.
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The rest of the proof follows along similar lines as in theorem 3.4. By the optimality of
the algorithm on the reported bid profile and since Q = S∗i ∪ (S − Ti) is feasible, we have:∑
t∈S′i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S′−S′i
bt ≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S−Ti−Ei
bt +
∑
t∈(S∩Ei)−Ti
wt
α
≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S−Ti−Ei
bt
By optimality of the algorithm on the initial bid profile we have:∑
t∈S
bt = W (S, a) ≥W (S′, a) =
∑
t∈S′
bt ≥
∑
t∈S′−S′i
bt
Combining we get: ∑
t∈S′i
wt
α
≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
+
∑
t∈S−Ti−Ei
bt −
∑
t∈S
bt
=
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
−
∑
t∈S∩(Ti∪Ei)
bt
≥
∑
t∈S∗i
wt
α
−
∑
t∈S∩Ti
bt −
∑
t∈S∩Ei
bt
Observe that by definition the utility of the player under the deviation is: UMi (a
∗
i , a−i; vi) =(
1− 1α
)∑
t∈S′i wt. Using the previous inequalities we can lower bound his utility as follows:
UMi (a
∗
i , a−i; vi) =
(
1− 1
α
)∑
t∈S′i
wt
≥
(
1− 1
α
) ∑
t∈S∗i
wt −
(
1− 1
α
)
· α ·
( ∑
t∈S∩Ti
bt +
∑
t∈S∩Ei
bt
)
Summing over all players:∑
i
UMi (a
∗
i , a−i; vi) ≥
(
1− 1
α
)
Opt(v)−
(
1− 1
α
)
· α ·
(∑
i
∑
t∈S∩Ti
bt +
∑
i
∑
t∈S∩Ei
bt
)
≥
(
1− 1
α
)
Opt(v)− (α− 1) · (k + 1)
∑
t∈S
bt
where the last inequality follows, since an element t ∈ E appears in at most k of the sets
T1, . . . , Tn and thereby
∑
i
∑
t∈S∩Ti bt ≤ k
∑
t∈S bt. By setting α =
1
k+1 + 1 =
k+2
k+1 , yields
the result.
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A. OMITTED PROOFS
A.1. Polymatroids
Proof of Theorem 3.5 : It is well-known (see e.g. Bikhchandani et al. [Bikhchandani et al.
2011] or Schrijver [Schrijver 2003]) that for a sufficiently small discretization of the allocation
space in δ units, if we consider the extended ground set where each element t, is duplicated
f({t})
δ times, then the feasibility constraint implied by the polymatroid on these extended
element set is a matroid. Moreover, if we denote with (t, k) the k-th copy of element t,
then if we assign a weight of bt · δ to each element (t, k), then as the discretization goes
to zero, the greedy algorithm on the matroid corresponds to the greedy algorithm on the
polymatroid. Subsequently the payment of the polymatroid mechanism coincides with the
payment of the extended matroid mechanism, when run on bids bt · δ for each copy of t.
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Last if we denote with w′t = wt · δ, then the value of a player for an allocation of discretized
units, corresponds to the value of a player in the discretized matroid that has value w′t for
each copy of element t.
Thus we can view the polymatroid mechanism as the limit of a matroid mechanism where
the players are restricted to submit the same bid on all copies of the same element. If we
show smoothness of this restricted bid mechanism, then the smoothness of the polymatroid
mechanism will follow by taking the limit of the discretization to zero.
In order to show smoothness, the only thing we need to observe is that the deviations
used in the smoothness proof of the matroid mechanism (Lemma 3.4) are simply scaled
versions of the valuation of a player. Thus it is easy to see, that if such scaled versions are
allowed in the restricted bid space, then the same proof shows smoothness of the matroid
mechanism under the restricted bid space. This is formalized in the following observation.
Observation A.1. Suppose that a mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth. Consider the mech-
anism M′, which is identical to M, with the exception that the action space of each player
is restricted to some subset A′i ⊂ Ai. If every action in the support of the deviations a∗i (v)
used to show smoothness of M, fall into action space A′i, then M′ is also (λ, µ)-smooth.
Since we assumed that the value of a player is additive and homogeneous, observe that
the weight w′t of a player for each element of the discretized matroid is identical for all
copies of element t. Thus the smoothness deviations of Lemma 3.4 would correspond to
bidding
w′t
α for each element of t, which is an action that belongs to the restricted strategy
space. Thus the matroid mechanism is smooth even under this restricted space, as long as
the value of a player for all copies of an element is identical. Hence, the theorem follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.6 : We first recall the submodular valuations setting. Suppose
that each player’s value vi(xi) is a monotone submodular function on the euclidean lat-
tice defined on R|Ei|+ . Then from [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013], we know that it can be
expressed as: vi(xi) = max`∈L
∑
t∈Ei vt(xt), with vt(·) being an increasing concave func-
tion. Since, it is easy to see that every increasing concave function can be expressed
as the maximum of functions that are linear up to a point and then constant: i.e.
vt(xt) = max`∈L w`t min{xt, q`t}, we can conclude that any submodular valuation can be
written as vi(xi) = max`∈L
∑
t∈Ei w
`
t ·min{xt, q`t}. for some index set L. Thus in order to
prove smoothness of the polymatroid mechanism, by Lemma 3.3 it suffices to show smooth-
ness for the following much simpler class of valuations: vi(xi) =
∑
t∈Ei wt ·min{xt, qt}.
However, we readily observe that if we consider an arbitrarily small discretization of the
polymatroid then the valuations of the players for the copies of an element t, will not be
identical. Instead, if we consider some arbitrary order of the copies, then the player will
have a value of wt · δ for the first qtδ copies and zero value for subsequent copies. Thus to
render the polymatroid mechanism smooth, we need to allow for the player to express such
valuations for the copies of the same element. To achieve this we introduce the modification
of the polymatroid mechanism under which the player can also submit allocation capacities
for each good.
If we consider an arbitrarily small discretization of the polymatroid, then the player can
submit a valuation that is wt·δα , for the first
qt
δ copies of element t and zero for the remaining,
by simply submitting a weight of wtα and a capacity of qt, to the polymatroid mechanism
with capacities.
